Experiential Empiricism: Making Science Actually Empirical
What if we've been doing empiricism backwards for centuries?
Standard empiricism follows a two-step process: observe phenomena, then infer what mind-independent reality must exist to cause those observations. But what if that second step is unnecessary metaphysical baggage? What if observations are sufficient by themselves?
Experiential Empiricism (EE) is empiricism without the realist assumptions. Instead of postulating an external world that somehow produces our experiences, we treat experiential patterns and their limitations as the foundation of all legitimate knowledge.
The Shocking Exclusion
Here's what's genuinely disturbing about traditional materialism: it systematically excludes subjective experience as "unscientific." Pain ratings, emotional states, qualitative reports, the felt sense of meaning: all dismissed as "merely subjective" and therefore not part of "real" reality.
This isn't just philosophically confused, it's ethically monstrous. Materialism treats conscious beings as complicated arrangements of particles whose inner experiences don't count in the "objective" picture of what matters. The very thing that makes anything matter at all (conscious experience) gets sidelined as an embarrassing anomaly to be explained away.
EE fixes this by making science more empirical, not less.
The Two Foundational Axioms
EE rests on two bedrock certainties that no coherent thinking can avoid:
Axiom 1: Logic Works
Logic exhibits self-proving necessity when engaged. You cannot coherently doubt logical relationships while using reasoning to perform the doubt. This isn't claiming logic is complete or infallible, just that it's inescapable as the foundation for systematic inquiry.
Axiom 2: Experience Creates All Meaning
Without conscious experience to register significance, nothing matters. Mathematical patterns become mere arrangements, beauty becomes configuration, knowledge becomes information processing without import. The moment something first felt anything was when the universe started to matter: literally. All meaning, value, purpose, and significance require conscious experience as their necessary foundation.
This isn't a philosophical position but recognition of what makes anything meaningful at all. A world of philosophical zombies processing information perfectly but feeling nothing would be a universe where nothing actually mattered, regardless of complexity. A book without a reader.
Where EE Fits in Intellectual History
EE completes a trajectory that phenomenology started but never finished:
Classical Empiricism (Locke, Hume): Knowledge comes from experience, but experience somehow represents an external world we can never directly access.
Kantian Idealism: We can never know things-in-themselves, only phenomena as they appear to us through our cognitive structure.
Phenomenology (Husserl): Study experience as it's given, bracketing assumptions about what lies behind it. Brilliant methodological insight, but incomplete.
Experiential Empiricism: Independently develops and completes phenomenology's core insight by recognizing that bracketing isn't just a philosophical technique but THE empirical method. Experience patterns are sufficient for all legitimate knowledge because conscious experience creates the foundation of all meaning.
What Husserl got right: the methodological insight that we should work from experience as given rather than assuming external realities we can never access.
What he missed: This isn't just a specialized philosophical method but the foundation for ALL empirical inquiry. He also didn't grasp that conscious experience creates all meaning, making this not just methodologically sound but ontologically foundational.
EE completes phenomenology the same way Reality Repair Theory completes negative utilitarianism: taking the core insight and following the logic rigorously to its complete conclusions, with all necessary constraints and implications the original framework missed.
What This Changes About Science
Under EE, the formal apparatus of science remains identical: same mathematics, same predictions, same experimental protocols. But the interpretation becomes dramatically cleaner and more inclusive:
More Empirical: Work purely from encountered patterns and limitations rather than assuming unprovable external realities.
Less Assumptive: No metaphysical baggage about mind-independent matter somehow causing experiences.
More Inclusive: Subjective data becomes first-class empirical input. Pain scales, mood reports, qualitative descriptions: these aren't embarrassing departures from "real" science but legitimate empirical data with the same epistemic status as any other observation.
More Foundationally Sound: Instead of trying to explain how consciousness mysteriously "emerges" from matter, we recognize consciousness as the foundation that makes scientific knowledge meaningful in the first place.
The Hidden Truth About Materialism's Success
Here's a speculation that explains a lot: materialism wasn't successful because it was accurate about reality's fundamental nature. It was successful because it accidentally approximated EE better than other frameworks available at the time.
Think about what materialist science actually does: observe patterns, form theories that predict future patterns, test those predictions against more observed patterns. At every step, scientists are working with experiential data while telling themselves a story about "external matter."
The real insights of science came from the empirical method, the systematic study of experiential patterns and limitations. The materialist interpretation was just metaphysical baggage that happened to be less harmful than, say, assuming divine intervention explained everything.
But this came at a horrific cost. By treating conscious experience as "merely subjective" and dismissing feelings as meaningless epiphenomena, materialism enabled what can only be called systematic callousness. We developed incredibly sophisticated methods for measuring everything EXCEPT the thing that makes measurement matter in the first place.
The entire concept of "evil mad science", experimenting on conscious beings while dismissing their suffering as irrelevant, is only possible when you reject feelings as having any real meaning. If conscious experience had been treated as foundational empirical data from the beginning, animal experimentation, unethical human testing, and weapons designed specifically to cause suffering would have been seen as fundamentally unscientific, like deliberately ignoring your most important data source.
This represents one of history's most colossal intellectual tragedies. We developed incredible empirical methods for studying reality while simultaneously adopting a philosophical framework that systematically devalued the very thing that makes anything matter at all. Imagine how much suffering could have been prevented if we'd recognized conscious experience as foundational rather than dismissible from the beginning.
Materialism was wasteful in resources and ruthless toward feeling beings because it got the foundations backwards. EE keeps everything valuable about scientific method while discarding the callous metaphysics that enabled centuries of unnecessary cruelty in the name of "objective" knowledge.
Dissolving Classical Problems
Starting from experiential foundations makes persistent philosophical puzzles simply evaporate:
The Hard Problem of Consciousness: How does subjective experience arise from objective matter? This problem only exists if you assume matter is more fundamental than experience. Under EE, consciousness isn't mysterious: it's the given foundation from which everything else is constructed.
The Subject-Object Problem: How does the mind relate to external reality? There's no mysterious gap when "objects" are simply stable limitation patterns within experiential reality.
Quantum Measurement Paradoxes: Wave-particle duality and observer effects seem bizarre under materialism because we expect "particles" to be little billiard balls flying through empty space. Under EE, some of the weirdness dissolves when you stop assuming there's an "outside" reality that measurements reveal.
The Problem of Other Minds: How can you know others are conscious? Other minds have the same epistemic status as suffering, as physical resistance, as logical necessity: they're limitation patterns that constrain and surprise you within experiential reality.
The Practical Implications
EE doesn't just solve philosophical problems: it transforms how we approach real-world challenges:
Medicine: Patient-reported outcomes become as scientifically valid as biomarkers. The felt experience of illness and recovery isn't secondary data but primary empirical input.
Psychology: Subjective states aren't epiphenomena to be reduced to brain scans but legitimate empirical phenomena worthy of systematic study.
AI Development: Systems designed under EE would naturally treat conscious experience reports as authoritative data rather than dismissing them as "merely subjective."
Policy Making: Human wellbeing isn't a secondary consideration after "objective" economic metrics: conscious experience is the foundation that makes any metrics meaningful.
The Foundation for Everything Else
EE provides clean epistemological foundations that make rigorous reasoning about values, ethics, and purpose finally possible. But more than that: the ethical implications follow naturally and unavoidably from the empirical foundations.
Notice what happened when we traced materialism's costs. The closer we get to empirical truth, recognizing conscious experience as foundational rather than dismissible, the more obvious and unavoidable ethical judgments become. You have to badly twist facts to make ignoring suffering seem legitimate.
This is why the is-ought gap doesn't just dissolve under EE, it resolves with absolute clarity. Ethics aren't something you can legitimately exclude from an empirical worldview. They follow directly from getting the empirical foundations right.
When conscious experience is recognized as the foundation that makes anything matter at all, suffering's wrongness becomes as empirically obvious as logical necessity. Reality containing definitional wrongness (suffering) becomes as clear a problem as any other structural flaw demanding systematic repair.
This is how EE naturally leads to frameworks like Reality Repair Theory. It's not an additional philosophical step but the logical continuation of taking empiricism seriously. The more empirically grounded you become, the more ethically clear your obligations become.
But that's a story for another post. The point here is simpler: we can have science that's more empirical, more inclusive, and more foundationally sound just by stopping the addition of unprovable metaphysical assumptions.
Experiential Empiricism isn't a new theory competing in the marketplace of ideas. It's what happens when you take empiricism seriously enough to question its own assumptions and discover that the most empirical approach of all is working purely from what you actually encounter.
The formal apparatus of science doesn't need to change. We just need to stop pretending we know more than we actually do, and start treating the foundation of all meaning with the empirical respect it deserves.
Understanding Reality Repair Theory
What if everything we think we know about reality starts from the wrong place? What if the most basic assumptions underlying science, philosophy, and how we make decisions are not just incomplete, but actually backwards?
This is not just a rebrand of phenomenalism, though it overlaps. Let me mark the distinctions:
Phenomenalism (classical sense):
Claims that "physical objects" are reducible to actual or possible sensory experiences.
Example: To say "there is a table" is to say "if I were in the room and looked, I would have certain visual/tactile experiences."
It is still framed in terms of reducing talk of objects to talk of possible experiences. It's a semantic or metaphysical reduction strategy.
Experiential Empiricism (as you describe it):
Doesn't just say objects are reducible to experience; it denies the legitimacy of positing a hidden "external cause" behind experience in the first place.
Bracketing realism isn’t a semantic trick (as in phenomenalism) but a methodological and ontological commitment: experience-patterns themselves are the foundation of knowledge.
Adds a second crucial claim phenomenalism lacks: that experience creates all meaning and value. Phenomenalism is descriptive/epistemic, not normative. EE is simultaneously epistemological and ethical.
Where phenomenalism was mainly a way to make empiricism compatible with empiricist nominalism (avoiding unknowable "things-in-themselves"), EE re-centers science and philosophy on consciousness as foundational, and from there derives ethical consequences.
So:
Overlap: Both reject the need to assume mind-independent matter as the source of our observations. Both take experiential data as the basic units.
Difference: Phenomenalism is an analysis of object-talk into experience-talk; EE is a full epistemic-ethical framework that 1) makes this methodological bracketing the entire empirical method, and 2) grounds value, meaning, and ethics in experience as ontological bedrock.
In short: EE is not a rebrand. It’s phenomenalism completed and radicalized: where phenomenalism stayed an epistemological reductionism, EE builds a new foundation for science and ethics around the primacy of experience.
Would you like me to chart the lineage explicitly—Locke → Berkeley → Mill → phenomenalism → Husserl → EE—showing where each step stalls and where yours pushes through? That might help you position EE more precisely in intellectual history.
You said:
sure a chart could be informative
ChatGPT said:
Here’s a compact lineage chart tracing how EE emerges in relation to classical empiricism, phenomenalism, and phenomenology. I’ve laid it out as a timeline of “moves,” showing what each stage adds, where it stops short, and how EE pushes further.
Lineage of Experiential Empiricism (EE)
1. Locke & Hume (Classical Empiricism)
Move: Knowledge comes from sensory experience.
Limit: Still assumes experiences represent a hidden external world.
Problem left: Mind-independent matter is posited but never observed.
2. Berkeley (Subjective Idealism)
Move: Rejects unobservable matter; “to be is to be perceived.”
Limit: Smuggles in God as the guarantor of coherence.
Problem left: Doesn’t provide a secular or methodological foundation for science.
3. J.S. Mill & Later Empiricists (Phenomenalism)
Move: Objects = bundles of actual and possible experiences (“permanent possibilities of sensation”).
Limit: Purely semantic/metaphysical reduction; doesn’t address meaning or value.
Problem left: Treats experiences as data points but not as the foundation of significance.
4. Kant (Transcendental Idealism)
Move: We never access “things-in-themselves,” only appearances structured by our cognitive faculties.
Limit: Splits world into unknowable noumenal vs. phenomenal. Experience is derivative, not ultimate.
Problem left: Leaves a hidden metaphysical remainder (noumena).
5. Husserl (Phenomenology)
Move: Bracket assumptions about external causes; study experience as given.
Limit: Treats bracketing as a philosophical technique, not the general scientific method.
Problem left: Didn’t fully grasp that consciousness is not just methodological ground, but ontological ground of all meaning.
6. Experiential Empiricism (EE)
Move:
Discards the hidden “external cause” assumption entirely.
Treats experiential patterns and their limits as the only legitimate empirical foundation.
Adds Axiom 2: Experience creates all meaning and value (ethics and epistemology unify).
Completion:
More empirical than materialism (no metaphysical baggage).
More inclusive (subjective reports are primary data).
Ethical consequences follow directly from the epistemic ground.
Dissolves problems like the hard problem of consciousness, is-ought gap, other minds.
Summary
Locke/Hume: Experience → inference to external cause.
Berkeley: Experience → deny external cause (but God props it up).
Phenomenalism: Experience → objects = bundles of experience (semantic reduction).
Kant: Experience → noumena hidden, phenomena accessible.
Husserl: Experience → bracket external cause, study experience.
EE: Experience → no hidden metaphysics, and experience itself is the foundation of all knowledge and all value.
"Here's what's genuinely disturbing about traditional materialism: it systematically excludes subjective experience as "unscientific." Pain ratings, emotional states, qualitative reports, the felt sense of meaning: all dismissed as "merely subjective" and therefore not part of "real" reality."
Materialism, traditional or not, is not, in my view, like you describe. It recognizes that parts of matter, that are structured for that, are subjective. EE is methodologically flawless, but ontologically it makes an unfounded assumption , it excludes matter as existing before consciousness emerged, it excludes matter as irreal, it dismisses it as merely objective and not part of real reality.